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Abstract The deployment of vehicular communication (VC)
systems is strongly dependent on their security and privacy
features. In this paper, we propose a security architecture for
VC. The primary objectives of the architecture include the
management of identities and cryptographic keys, the security
of communications, and the integration of privacy enhancing
technologies. Our design approach aims at a system that relies on
well-understood components which can be upgraded to provide
enhanced security and privacy protection in the future. This
effort is undertaken by SeVeCom (http://www.sevecom.org), a
transversal project providing security and privacy enhancing
mechanisms compatible with the VC technologies currently under
development by all EU funded projects.
I. INTRODUCTION
Vehicular communications (VC) lie at the core of a num-
ber of industry and academic research initiatives aiming to
enhance safety and efciency of transportation systems. Ve-
hicles and road-side infrastructure units (RSUs), i.e., network
nodes, will be equipped with on-board processing and wireless
communication modules. Vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-
to-infrastructure (V2I) communication will enable applications
that provide warnings on environmental hazards (e.g., ice on
the pavement), as well as trafc and road conditions (e.g.,
emergency braking, congestion, or construction sites).
VC offer a rich set of tools to drivers and administrators
of transportation systems but, at the same time, they make
possible a formidable set of abuses and attacks. Consider,
for example, nodes that 'contaminate' large portions of the
vehicular network with false information, or the deployment
of nodes that collect VC messages, track the location and
transactions of vehicles and infer sensitive information about
their drivers. Worse even, vehicles and their processing and
sensing equipment can be physically compromised, while any
wireless-enabled device could pose a threat to the VC system.
These simple examples of exploits indicate that under all
circumstances VC systems must be secured. Otherwise anti-
social and criminal behavior could be made easier, actually
jeopardizing the benets of the VC system deployment. A
comprehensive set of security mechanisms is thus critical, and
facilities and protocols that mitigate attacks are necessary.
Securing vehicular communications is a hard problem, due
to the tight coupling between applications and the networking
fabric, as well as additional societal, legal, and economical
considerations, which raise a unique combination of opera-
tional and security requirements.
In this paper, we propose a security architecture to address
this challenge. Our objective is to design a baseline architec-
ture, which, on the one hand, provides a sufcient level of
protection for users and legislators, and, on the other hand,
is practical and deployable. The baseline architecture relies
on well-established and understood cryptographic primitives,
which are already broadly implemented and scrutinized and
thus deserve to be sufciently trusted. At the same time,
our architecture allows deployed systems to be tuned or aug-
mented, in order to meet more stringent future requirements.
We describe next the objectives and then the basic elements
of our architecture.
II. ARCHITECTURE OBJECTIVES
The fundamental aspects that our architecture seeks to
address are: (i) identity and cryptographic key management,
(ii) privacy protection, (iii) secure communication, and (iv)
in-car protection and tamper-resistance. The architecture will
also enable detection of faulty (inconsistent) data and node
actions, aspects not discussed in this paper. The focus of
our efforts is on securing communications and the operation
of the wireless part of the VC system. At the same time,
disclosure and inference of sensitive user information must
be prevented. In particular, it must be difcult for two or
more communications of the same node (in particular, of a
private vehicle) to be linked. However, identication should
be possible when necessary, e.g., for liability attribution or
illegitimate node exclusion. Our design is fully cognizant of
the projected co-existence of TCP/IP and VC-specic protocol
stacks in VC systems. In the sections that follow, we describe
the architecture components and mechanisms.
III. AUTHORITIES
Drawing from the analogy with existing administrative
processes and automotive authorities (e.g., city or state transit
authorities), a large number of certication authorities (CAs)
will exist. Each of them is responsible for the identity manage-
ment of all vehicles registered in its region (national territory,
district, county, etc.). Fig.1 illustrates a part of an instantiation
of the CAs: an hierarchical structure within each CA and
cross-certication among CAs. This way, the deployment of
secure vehicular communications could still be handled locally
to a great extent. At the same time, vehicles registered with
different CAs can communicate securely
Fig. 1. Example of Hierarchical Organization and Relations of Certication
Authorities.
as soon as they validate the certicate of one CAA on the
public key of CAB . Various procedures for easily obtaining
these cross-certicates can be implemented.
Nodes of the vehicular network are registered with exactly
one CA. Each node, vehicle or RSU, has a unique identity
V and a pair of private and public cryptographic keys, kV
and KV , respectively, and is equipped with a certicate
CertCA{V,KV , AV , T}, where AV is a list of node attributes
and T the certicate lifetime. The CA issues such certicates
for all nodes upon registration, and upon expiration of a
previously held certicate.
We emphasize that the CA manages long-term identities,
credentials, and cryptographic keys for vehicles. In contrast to
short-lived keys and credentials, as those discussed in Sec.IV.
The CA is also responsible for evicting nodes from the system,
if necessary, either for administrative or technical reasons.
This issue is discussed in Sec.VI. The interaction of nodes
with the CA does not need to be continuous, while the road-
side infrastructure or other infrastructure-based networks (e.g.,
cellular) could act as a gateway to the vehicular part of the
network or offer an alternative method of connectivity.
IV. PRIVACY ENHANCING MECHANISMS
As a basic guideline, processes and policies for privacy pro-
tection should be dened, with minimum private information
disclosure on a need-basis, and ne-grained control mecha-
nisms for regulating private information disclosure. Nonethe-
less, signed messages can be trivially linked to the certicate
of the signing node; thus, the removal of all information
identifying the user (e.g., driver) from node certicates does
make communications anonymous.
We extend this concept rst introduced by [7]: we equip
each private vehicle with a set of distinct certied public keys
that do not provide additional identifying information, denoted
as pseudonyms. Instead of using its long-term key pair, a
node utilizes the private key corresponding to a pseudonym
to sign outgoing messages, and appends the pseudonym to
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Fig. 2. Enhancing Privacy with Pseudonyms. (a) Basic pseudonym format,
(b) Periodic vehicle rell with a new set of pseudonyms.
the messages. Messages signed under the same pseudonym
(i.e., using the same corresponding private key) can be trivially
linked to each other. Yet, as the vehicle changes pseudonyms,
linking messages signed under different pseudonyms becomes
increasingly hard over time and space.
Fig. 2.(a) illustrates a pseudonym that has a lifetime and an
identier of the corresponding pseudonym provider A, which
is in general an entity distinct from the CA. Note that there
may be multiple pseudonym providers, either as independent
entities specializing in this task, or as administered by different
entities (e.g., various service providers, car manufacturers,
highway or city transportation authorities).
Fig. 2.(b) clues on the concept of periodic vehicle rells
with new pseudonyms: a node utilizing pseudonyms out of
the i-th set, obtains an (i + 1)-st set of pseudonyms while it
can still operate with pseudonyms in the i-th set, and switches
to those in the (i + 1)-st once no pseudonym in the i-th can
be used. Recall that each pseudonym is used for a period of
time which can be determined by various factors. The rate of
pseudonym changes determines, along with the frequency of
rells the size of the pseudonym set the node should obtain.
Fig.3 summarizes factors determining when a pseudonym
change, and a choice of a pseudonym among possibly multi-
ple available sets, S1, . . . , Sn, of pseudonyms, should occur.
The rate at which a node switches from one pseudonym to
another depends on the degree of protection the vehicle seeks,
local or system-wide policies, vehicle inputs (e.g., location or
velocity), the verier of the messages issued (signed) under
a specic pseudonym, and other network operation consider-
ations (e.g., communication with an access point through the
TCP/IP stack).
The change of a pseudonym should be accompanied by a
change of the node identiers used by underlying networking
protocols. In particular, this can be the Medium Access Control
(MAC), and other identiers such as IP addresses. If such
identiers do not change along with the pseudonym, messages
generated by a node could be trivially linked according to
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Fig. 3. Pseudonym Changing Framework.
the addresses used by the node's hardware and software. It is
equally important to ensure that message transmissions from
a node cannot be linked to each other due to the use of any
alternative medium (e.g., cellular telephony) transceiver whose
identier remains xed.
On the other hand, the network operation may require that
node identiers remain unchanged for a specic period of
time. This implies that a change of pseudonym would be
ineffective and thus meaningless throughout the period a pro-
tocol identier must remain unchanged. Two such situations
are shown in Fig.4. First, consider a vehicle within range of
an access point APA, utilizing a pseudonym PNYMi, and
an IP address IPA dynamically assigned by APA; the vehicle
IP address must not be changed throughout, for example, a
data download session. Similarly, while in range of an APB ,
the vehicle utilizes PNYMj and is assigned an IPB , and
establishes a session with a node S at the wire-line part of
the network. If it is necessary for the vehicle to maintain
the same identier (e.g., an IP address IPS) throughout
such a communication with S, it could be tracked by an
eavesdropper of the wireless medium transmissions, especially
if IPS is used as the vehicle reconnects to S through another
APC . To remedy this, end-to-end trafc and identication
(IPS) should be encrypted. Then, only the newly assigned
IPC is visible over the wireless medium, as were IPA, IPB
while in range of APA, APB . However, such addresses are at
most locators, merely indicating that PNYMi, PNYMj and
PNYMk respectively are within range of the corresponding
access points.
V. TRUSTED COMPONENTS
Implementing security for vehicular communications re-
quires the vehicles to be equipped with a Trusted Component
(TC). Many vehicles are already equipped with components,
such as speed limiters, tachographs, and event data recorders
(EDRs), considered critical by manufacturers and legislators.
We assume that nodes are equipped with a Trusted Compo-
nent, i.e., tamper-resistant hardware and rmware.
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Fig. 4. Interaction of Pseudonym Changes and Network Protocol Stack
Functionality.
The main role of the TC is to store sensitive cryptographic
material (e.g., private keys) and to perform cryptographic
operations using that material. For this reason, the TC must
have a processing unit, a memory module, and some non-
volatile storage. In addition, in order to ensure the freshness
of the cryptographically protected messages produced by the
TC, it must also have a real-time clock, and consequently, a
battery module that ensures the independent operation of this
clock.
Note that having a trusted clock is indispensable, as other-
wise the TC could be coerced to produce cryptographically
protected beacon messages in the future that can later be
used to mislead other vehicles. For instance, someone that
has unsupervised access to the vehicle (e.g., a mechanic in
a garage) could feed the TC with a clock value t in the
future, and with appropriately chosen, fake position and speed
information, ~p and ~v, respectively. The TC would then produce
a signed beacon message containing the fake timing, position,
and speed information, which could be recorded and broadcast
later at time t and at position ~p, without the TC being present.
Note also that one could include the positioning system
and the other sensors of the vehicle within the TC, but in
our opinion, this is not indispensable as long as the TC is
equipped with its own trusted clock. The TC could still be fed
with incorrect position information and sensorial data, but now
the attacker must do this in real-time, which is considerably
more difcult. In particular, not having unsupervised access
to the vehicle constantly, the attacker must install some rogue
equipment inside the vehicle that feeds the TC with corrupted
position information and other fake sensorial data. In-vehicle
intrusion detection mechanisms could be used to mitigate this
problem.
We require the TC to be physically protected against tam-
pering; indeed, this property of the TC is where trust in it is
derived from. The physical protection of the TC should ensure
at least tamper evidence. However, this may not be enough,
as regular inspection of the vehicles is rather infrequent (e.g.,
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in some countries it happens in every second year), which
results in a large vulnerability window. Therefore, it is desired
that the physical protection of the TC also ensures some level
of tamper resistance. We understand that high-end tamper
resistant hardware modules are very expensive, therefore, in
order for our baseline architecture to be practically feasible,
we require only a minimal level of tamper resistance that can
be achieved with special packaging and coatings.
Finally, we note that tamper resistant devices can be com-
promised by exploiting weaknesses in their API [5], a software
layer that provides access to the functions of the device for
applications running outside of the device (in our case, on
the on-board computer of the vehicle). Therefore, the API of
the TC must be carefully designed so that it does not contain
exploitable weaknesses. The provision of guidelines for this is
on our future research agenda.
VI. PSEUDONYMITY AND CREDENTIAL REVOCATION
Pseudonyms are bound to the vehicles' long-term identities,
with a pseudonymity resolution authority PRA being able to
infer this mapping if necessary, for example, for liability attri-
bution. Messages signed by the same vehicle using different
pseudonyms can be linked by PRA. In the simplest system
conguration, the CA is the pseudonym provider and the
pseudonymity resolution authority. Then, it sufces for the CA
to maintain a map of pseudonyms to the long-term identity
of the vehicle. In general, different solutions with differing
properties are possible; for example, the pseudonym to long-
term identity mapping could be maintained by the pseudonym
provider itself, or the pseudonym provider could maintain
evidence of the mapping that only PRA can utilize to resolve
the pseudonym.
Beyond pseudonym resolution, a node that is deemed ille-
gitimate (e.g., its registration expired) or malfunctioning can
be removed from the network. This is possible by revoking
the pseudonyms and the long-term credentials of the node. If
the long-term credentials of a node are revoked, the node is
evicted but it is not automatically prevented from participating
in the VC system operation. This is so because the pseudonyms
that the node is equipped with, rather than the long-term
credentials, are utilized for communication.
However, long-term credentials are used by vehicles to
obtain new sets of pseudonyms: nodes use them to establish
with the pseudonym provider that they are legitimate members
of the system, i.e., registered with a CA. This implies that one
option is to notify directly the pseudonym providers regarding
revoked nodes. This way, no communication overhead over
the wireless medium is necessary.
Yet, the need to revoke not-already-expired pseudonyms
previously provided to a revoked node remains. If pseudonyms
are not issued by the CA, coordination of the CA and the
pseudonym provider is necessary. Furthermore, we identify a
trade-off: the more frequent the pseudonym rells are, the
easier the revocation (fewer pseudonyms to revoke), at the
expense of higher cost and inferior usability due to frequent
executions of the rell protocol. For example, one can
Fig. 5. Secure Communication: Basic Message Format.
imagine a situation when the vehicle fails to obtain new
pseudonyms, after having utilized all available valid ones, if
the pseudonym provider is unreachable.
We provide multiple revocation options tailored to the scale
of VC systems. First, a Revocation of the Trusted Component
(RTC) protocol, with the CA instructing directly the TC to
erase all cryptographic material and acknowledge the cease
of operation, and in case RTC does not conclude successfully.
Second, revocation through the distribution of compressed cer-
ticate revocation lists, namely, the RCCRL protocol, which
utilizes RSUs or low-speed broadcast media to distribute the
revocation information. The infrastructure acts as a gateway
for dissemination of revocation information and the execution
of the revocation protocols. The three methods are discussed
in [29]. An alternative third approach could be to require
that vehicles regularly acquire proofs that their credentials
remain valid. Instead of requiring them to download revocation
information, vehicles download veriers from the CA or the
pseudonym provider. These veriers are then included when
the certicate is presented to other nodes [24], [18].
VII. SECURE COMMUNICATION
The basic tool to secure communications is digital sig-
natures, and can be used for all messages. Fig. 5 illus-
trates a typical message format, with a signature calculated
by a node V using the private key pkjV corresponding
to the j-th pseudonym PKjV of V , that is, public key
PKjV . CertA{PKjV } denotes PKjV and the signature of
the pseudonym provider A (as illustrated in Fig.2.(a).). For
simplicity, we omit notation on the pseudonym set. The
messages also have a time-stamp, the sender's clock value,
and a geo-stamp, the sender's coordinates, at the sending time.
This mechanism can be applied to different types of mes-
sages, which fall roughly in the following three main cate-
gories, as expected in VC systems:
Beaconing: Frequently broadcasted messages at the data
link layer; the beacons include information on the sender, such
as sensor information or warnings.
Restricted Flooding: Messages, for example disseminat-
ing warnings, throughout a targeted area, are relayed by nodes.
Their propagation is restricted by the use of traditional time-
to-live elds, and/or by use of geographic distance constraints
(geo-casting).
Position-Based Routing: Data are unicasted from a sender
to a specic destination across multiple wireless hops: the
coordinates of the destination are given in the data packet,
4
and relaying nodes forward the packet to their neighbor with
the minimum remaining distance to the destination.
For beaconing, a single signature sufces. For multihop
propagation, depending on the type of message, the originator
appends its signature, while hop-by-hop signatures can also be
added and removed. The latter option, with the combination
of signatures, is also meaningful for securing Position-Based
Routing [13].
A. Other Considerations
We assume that condentiality is needed only for unicast
message transport, for example, using a symmetric session
key transported by the sender to the receiver via public key
cryptography. Entity authentication is rather straightforward
to achieve in our context. Prevention of denial of service
attacks against lower layers (e.g., jamming) or by injection
of faulty data, especially if aggregation is performed, are also
relevant. Yet, to mitigate them, specialized mechanisms, e.g.,
detection of faulty nodes, other than the above-discussed ones
are necessary.
VIII. SYSTEM PERFORMANCE VALIDATION
Security mechanisms add overhead to the systems they
safeguard. Among other affected system properties, real-time
performance is usually degraded due to several factors. Ve-
hicular communications are not an exception, with security
on performance affected by security overhead. In the context
of our architecture, security costs are due to the following
parameters: (i) costly public key cryptography, (ii) frequent
periodic broadcasts, and (iii) large network scale. Building on
the above observations, it is crucial to consider the real-time
performance properties of any security mechanism developed
for vehicular communications. Hence, validation of security
protocols must include their real-time performance footprint
in a vehicular communications scenario. In this section we
discuss two approaches to achieve this, namely worst-case
analysis and realistic simulation of typical scenarios.
A. Worst-case analysis
The application of worst-case analysis on an early version of
a protocol provides an estimate on its suitability for vehicular
communications. If its performance footprint does not exceed a
worst-case upper bounds, a candidate security protocol can be
further evaluated and compared to alternative protocols. This
stage involves realistic simulation in several typical scenarios
as discussed earlier. As an example, we applied the above
approaches to evaluate the suitability of digital signatures for
use in vehicular communications [28], rst using worst-case
analysis then simulation in both uid and congested highway
scenarios, and identied that among three different public key
cryptosystems Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) is more
suitable for secure vehicular communications.
As is often the case in other networking paradigms, sce-
narios and deployment settings for vehicular communications
vary considerably as well. For example, the number of lanes,
the time of the day and the road section all affect the
number of vehicles that can broadcast safety messages within
mutual communication range. Hence, it is hard to come up
with precise evaluations of the security costs. This is why
one could opt for worst-case back-of-the-envelope analysis:
roughly estimating the highest number of security-related
messages a vehicle has to process at any given moment. Such
an estimation yields an upper bound on the allowable security
cost. Which, in turn, is used to evaluate the appropriateness of
different security mechanisms for vehicular communications.
The advantage of this approach is that it accounts for most
possible scenarios. On the downside, it is approximate, thus a
more detailed evaluation method is needed.
B. Realistic simulation
Given the large scale of vehicular networks and the di-
versity of possible scenarios, realistic simulation of vehicular
communications can yield the desired performance gures for
specic protocols. In contrast to the worst-case analysis, sim-
ulation should consider specic scenarios to compare security
protocols. This is notably motivated by the fact that network
topology and mobility seriously affect the performance of
different protocols. Hence, some protocols perform better in
static scenarios (e.g., congestion) and others are more suitable
in highly mobile scenarios (e.g., uid highways). An early
example beyond the VANET context related to this distinction
with respect to security costs can be found in [14].
Realistic simulation of security protocols is more tedious
than worst-case analysis, but gives a ne-grained performance
evaluation. Several tools for VANET simulations have been
recently developed. Some of them are not publicly available
[23], some are not yet fully developped [8], [30], others
do not use realistic mobility models [31], whereas none of
those efforts implements security mechanisms. To ll these
gaps, we are currently developing TraNS (Trafc and Network
Simulation Environment) [17], a simulation environment that
integrates both trafc and network simulators. The incorpora-
tion of the trafc simulator allows dening a network topology
based on real road networks and road-side infrastructure, e.g.
trafc lights. It allows to generate realistic mobile traces
used by the network simulator. The latter simulates wireless
communication among vehicles and implements the logic of
applications running on top of VANETs. Current implemen-
tation uses SUMO (trafc simulator) [15] and ns2 (network
simulator) [16]. In addition, we are working on the integration
of several security mechanisms into TraNS.
IX. RELATED WORK
Recent works outline challenges for securing vehicular com-
munications [33], [27], [25]. Attacks specic to VC systems
are described in [4], [2], [10] and attacker models are analyzed
in [26]. Security and privacy requirements are outlined in
[28], [1], [19], [25]. Principles for designing security and
privacy-enhancing mechanisms for VC systems are proposed
in [26]. Frameworks and architectures for vehicular security
were proposed in [29], [21], [32], [11], [3].
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A range of security mechanisms not cited above have
been proposed proposed. For example, [12] detects malicious
data and [21] validates position data; communication security
proposals in [29], [20], [13]; privacy enhancing mechanisms
[28], [22], [9]; the effectiveness of changing pseudonyms to
provide location privacy in vehicular networks is analyzed in
[6].
The Berkeley PATH project in the USA and the German
project Fleetnet. did not considered security aspects. The
IEEE P1609.2 standard [1] is part of the DSRC standards
for VC supported by the US Vehicle Safety Communica-
tion Consortium (VSCC). The project NoW - Network on
Wheels is a follow-up to the Fleetnet project and is based
on wireless multi-hop communication. The working group
Adhoc Data Security focuses on security issues. Security
is also among the topics addressed by the Car2Car Com-
munication Consortium (C2C-CC), a non-prot organization
initiated by European vehicle manufacturers (Audi, BMW,
DaimlerChrysler, Fiat, Renault, Volkswagen).
X. CONCLUSIONS
We present the basic ideas of a security architecture for
vehicular communication systems, with the focus on commu-
nication. The basic objectives of the proposed architecture,
in the context of the Sevecom project, are: identity and
cryptographic key management, privacy protection, secure
communication, and in-car protection and tamper-resistance.
At the same time, identication of nodes, which are other-
wise protected by privacy-enhancing mechanisms, is possible
when necessary, e.g., for liability attribution. Our design ap-
proach seeks to produce a baseline architecture and solution.
On the one hand, our baseline architecture combines well-
accepted building blocks (e.g., cryptographic primitives) and
concepts (e.g., anonymized certicates/pseudonyms) adopted.
The use of well-established security mechanisms facilitates
deployment. On the other hand, our baseline architecture is
adaptable, so that mechanisms or other changes aiming at
higher protection levels can be introduced transparently in the
future.
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